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Abstract
The Firefighter Problem was proposed in 1995 [25] as a determinis-
tic discrete-time model for the spread and containment of a fire. The
problem is defined on an undirected finite graph G = (V,E), where
initially fire breaks out at f nodes. In each subsequent time-step, two
actions occur: A certain number b of firefighters are placed on non-
burning nodes, permanently protecting them from the fire. Then the
fire spreads to all non-defended neighbors of the nodes on fire. Since
the graph is finite, at some point each node is either on fire or saved,
and thus the fire cannot spread further. One of the objectives for the
problem is to place the firefighters in such a way that the number of
saved nodes is maximized.
The applications of the Firefighter problem reach from real fires
to the spreading of diseases and the containment of floods. Further-
more, it can be used to model the spread of computer viruses or viral
marketing in communication networks. Most research on the problem
considers the case in which the fire starts in a single place (i.e., f = 1),
and in which the budget of available firefighters per time-step is one
(i.e., b = 1). So does the work in this paper too. This configuration
already leads to hard problems and even in this case the problem is
known to be NP-hard.
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In this work, we study the problem from a game-theoretical per-
spective. We introduce a strategic game model for the Firefighter Prob-
lem to tackle its complexity from a different angle. We refer to it as
the Firefighter Game. Such a game-based context seems very appropri-
ate when applied to large networks, where entities may act and make
decisions based on their own interests, without global coordination.
At every time-step of the game, a player decides whether to place
a new firefighter in a non-burning node of the graph. If so, he must
decide where to place it. By placing it, the player is indirectly deciding
which nodes to protect at that time-step. We define different utility
functions in order to model selfish and non-selfish scenarios, which
lead to equivalent games. We show that the Price of Anarchy (PoA)
is linear for a particular family of graphs, but it is at most 2 for trees.
We also analyze the quality of the equilibria when coalitions among
players are allowed. It turns out that it is possible to compute an
equilibrium in polynomial time, even for constant size coalitions. This
yields to a polynomial time approximation algorithm for the problem
and its approximation ratio equals the PoA of the corresponding game.
We show that for some specific topologies, the PoA is constant when
constant size coalitions are considered.
Keywords: Firefighter Problem; Algorithmic Game Theory; Strate-
gic Games; Nash Equilibria; Price of Anarchy; Coalitions.
1 Introduction
The Firefighter Problem was introduced by Hartnell [25] as a deterministic
discrete-time model for the spread and containment of fire. Since then, it
has been subject to a wide variety of research for modeling the spread and
containment phenomena such as diseases, floods, ideas in social networks
and viral marketing.
The Firefighter Problem is defined on an undirected finite graph G =
(V,E), where initially fire breaks out at f nodes. In each subsequent time-
step, two actions occur: first, a certain number b of firefighters are placed on
non-burning nodes, thus permanently protecting them from the fire; then
the fire spreads to all non-defended neighbors of the nodes on fire. Since
the graph is finite, at some point each node is either on fire or saved. Then
the process finishes, because the fire can not spread any further. There are
several different objectives for the problem. Typically, the goal is to save the
maximum number of nodes. Other objectives include minimizing the num-
ber of firefighters (or time-steps) until the spreading stops, or determining
whether a specified collection of nodes can be prevented from burning.
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Most research on the Firefighter Problem (also the work in this paper)
considers the case with only one starting place on fire, and one available
firefighter to protect a non-burning place at a time (i.e., f = b = 1), which
already leads to hard problems. The problem was proved NP-hard for bipar-
tite graphs [30], graphs with degree three [17], cubic graphs [28] and unit disk
graphs [21]. However, the problem is polynomial-time solvable for various
well-known graph classes, including interval graphs, split graphs, permu-
tation graphs, caterpillars, and Pk-free graphs for fixed k [18, 23, 30, 21].
Furthermore, the problem is (1 − 1/e)-approximable on general trees [8],
1.3997-approximable for trees where nodes have at most three children [27],
and it is NP-hard to approximate within n(1−ε) for any ε > 0 [2]. Later
results on approximability for several variants of the problem can be found
in [2, 4, 11].
Recently, the scientific community has focused on the study of the pa-
rameterized complexity of the problem. It was shown to be fixed parameter-
tractable with respect to the combined parameter “pathwidth” and “max-
imum degree” [10]. Other important results can be found in [12, 3]. From
this perspective, the problem is known to be fixed-parameter tractable on
trees in various parameterizations. When parameterized by the number of
burned nodes, the problem is fixed-parameter tractable (FPT) on general
graphs but has no polynomial kernel on trees. When parameterized by
the number of unburned nodes, the problem is W[1]-hard even on bipartite
graphs.
In 2000, the greedy algorithm for trees, which saves the vertex v that
maximizes the number of nodes that will be saved if v is protected, was
proved to be a 1/2-approximation algorithm [26]. A linear programming
relaxation for trees that supposedly gives a c-approximation algorithm was
presented in 2006 [24], and a sub-exponential (1−1/e)-approximation method
in 2008 [8]. These results have been improved in 2011 [27]. On the other
hand, exact polynomial solutions exist for caterpillar and P-trees [18, 23, 30].
First approaches for grids of dimensions 2 and 3 were provided in 2002
[20, 34], and then generalized in 2007 [13]. These studies concluded that two
firefighter were needed to contain the fire in an infinite 2-dimensional square
grid, and 2d − 1 in a d-dimensional one with d ≥ 3. There exist concrete
results for triangular, strong, and hexagonal grids [20, 31, 32, 33, 22], and
for other graph classes [21].
The surviving rate of a graph is defined as the average percentage of
nodes that can be saved when f fires break out at random nodes of the graph
[7]. The study of this concept has become very fruitful in the literature and
the evidence is the existence of many works on the subject for different graph
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structures [9, 6, 14, 16, 29, 36, 41, 44, 42, 43].
A complementary concept is called the burning number of a graph. It
indicates how fast a graph can burn down completely if there is a new fire
in every round. It can be used as a measure of the speed of the spread of
contagion in a graph [5].
For other variants of the Firefighter Problem see [15, 35, 18].
In this work we introduce a game-theoretical model for the Firefighter
Problem to tackle its complexity from a different angle. Our main objec-
tive is to try to bypass the NP-hardness of the problem of computing the
optimal solution of the Firefighter Problem by taking into account different
kinds of solutions. Our proposal as a possible set of solutions to the Fire-
fighter Problem corresponds to the set of Nash equilibria of a new strategic
game that we call the Firefighter Game. In this game there is a player
for each time-step. Each player decides where to put the firefighters at his
corresponding time-step. The goal of each player is to save as many nodes
as possible. The outcomes of this strategic game represent solutions to the
classical Firefighter Problem. Game theory provides a powerful toolset to
analyze the quality of stable outcomes or equilibria.
To the best of our knowledge, the only existing game-theoretical models
to similar problems are those referred to as the vaccination problem [2, 19],
the spreading of rumors [45, 46] and competitive diffusion [1, 37, 40, 39, 38].
Those models however focus on information spreading on social networks,
and thus take into account other inherent aspects of those scenarios, like pref-
erences, reputation, popularity and other personal traits of the users, and
relevance or truthfulness of the information. Our proposal is well-suited
to model fighting against spreading phenomena in large networks, where
the protection strategy for each time-step is decided by one player, indepen-
dently from the others. We believe that our model has legitimacy, especially
if this problem is used to model processes that take place on some modern
networks where no central entity exists. In this case, the resources to fight
the spreading have to be delegated by independent agents, who might not
be able to compute a global solution. Once we have defined formally the
model, we focus on the study of the Nash equilibria and the Price of Anarchy
as measures for the quality of the equilibria.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we define some basic
game-theoretical concepts extensively used throughout the paper, most im-
portantly the measures of the quality of equilibria, i.e. the Price of Anarchy.
In Section 3 we introduce the game and we study the set of equilibria corre-
sponding to two different utility functions. In Section 4 we analyze the Price
of Anarchy for different families of graphs. In Section 5 we consider that the
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players may form coalitions and we analyze the equilibria for constant size
coalitions. Finally, conclusions and directions for future work can be found
in Section 7.
2 Game-Theoretical Definitions
Let us introduce some basic definitions. A strategic game G is defined by a
tuple G = (N , (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ), where
• N denotes the set of players,
• Si is the set of actions of player i ∈ N , and
• ui is the utility function of player i ∈ N .
The strategy si of a player i is selecting an action si ∈ Si. Let s =
(s1, . . . , s|N |) be a strategy profile describing the strategies si of each player
i ∈ N . We denote by S the set of all strategy profiles, S = S1 × . . .× S|N |.
The utility function of player i, ui : S → R, assigns to each strategy profile
(s1, . . . , s|N |) ∈ S a value ui(s1, . . . , s|N |). This value quantifies the benefit
that player i receives by selecting strategy si when the strategies of other
players are (sj)j∈N ,j 6=i.
Given a strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , s|N |), we denote s−i = (sj)j∈N\{i}.
Furthermore we denote (s−i, s′i) = (s1, . . . , s
′
i, . . . , s|N |), i.e. strategy vector
s, where player i changed his strategy from si to s
′
i. The social benefit of
the outcome of the game for any strategy profile is quantified by a function
that is called Social Welfare W : S → R.
Definition 1 (Nash Equilibrium). A strategy profile of a game is a Nash
equilibrium, if no player can improve his payoff by changing his strategy.
Formally, given a strategic game G = (N , (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ), a strategy profile
s is a Nash equilibrium of G if and only if
∀i ∈ N ,∀s′i ∈ Si : ui(s) ≥ ui(s−i, s′i).
We denote by ne(G) the set of all Nash equilibria of G. Whenever there
is no possible confusion we will use the notation ne without any reference
to the game. In order to measure the quality of the equilibria, Koutsoupias
and Papadimitriou introduced the Price of Anarchy concept in 1999.
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Definition 2 (Price of Anarchy). The Price of Anarchy (PoA) of a game
G (with respect to a social welfare function W ) is defined as follows:
PoA(G) = maxs∈SW (s)
mins∈neW (s)
.
If instead of considering the worst equilibria with relation to the social
welfare, we consider the best equilibria, then we have the Price of Stability.
Definition 3 (Price of Stability). The Price of Stability (PoS) of a game G
(with respect to a social welfare function W ) is defined as follows:
PoS(G) = maxs∈SW (s)
maxs∈neW (s)
.
3 The Firefighting Game
Each instance of the Firefighting Problem is defined by an undirected graph
G = (V,E) and a marked node v0 ∈ V . We assume that initially the fire
breaks out at v0 and it burns. At each time-step t ≥ 1 the burned nodes
at time step t − 1 incinerate all their neighboring nodes. Let us call them
burning nodes. At each time-step a fixed number of firefighters b, called
budget, can be placed on non-burning nodes to permanently protect them
from burning. These nodes are called defended. If a node never burns
because it is defended or cut off from the fire it is called saved. All other
nodes are called vulnerable. We only consider the case where budget is of
size one (i.e., b = 1).
Players and Strategies. In order to model the Firefighter problem as a
game, we define a set of players N = {1, . . . , n − 1} where n = |V |. Player
i represents the firefighter who selects the set of nodes to be protected at
time step i. Hence, the set of all possible strategies of player i is defined by
Si = {U | U ⊆ V }. The strategy of player i consists of selecting a subset
of nodes U ∈ Si. Since we only deal with the case of b = 1 we overload
notation and instead of subsets of size one, we set the strategies to the
vertices themselves or the empty set, i.e. Si = V ∪ {∅}. This means that
every player can choose one node or the empty set as strategy. Note that
player i ∈ N applies its strategy si at time step i. Let s = (s1, . . . , s|N |)
denote the strategy profile of all players.
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The outcome of a strategy profile. The outcome of a strategy profile
s = (s1, . . . , s|N |) on a given graph G = (V,E) is a partition of V into
saved and burning nodes. It is defined in the following way. At time-step
0 the only burning node is v0. At time-step i > 0, two events occur: First,
player i’s node is protected if his action is valid w.r.t. to strategy profile s,
i.e. it is neither burning nor already defended at the end of time-step i− 1.
Second, each node burning at time-step i−1 incinerates all its non-defended
neighbors. The process stops when the fire cannot spread any further. Let
us denote by Safe(s) ⊂ V the set of nodes that are saved by the strategy
profile s.
In the following we introduce some predicates in order to define formally
the outcome of a strategy profile on a given graph G.
Notice that, when no further restrictions apply on the strategies for each
player, then it might be the case that a player selects a node that is already
burning or that already has a firefighter on it. In order to identify these
situations, we introduce additional predicates. Given a strategy profile s, a
node v ∈ V , and a player i ∈ N we define:
• defended(s, v, i) = true iff in the strategy profile s, node v is defended
at the end of time-step i,
• burning(s, v, i) = true iff in the strategy profile s, node v is burning
at the end of time-step i, and
• invalid(s, i) = true iff player i’s action is not valid with respect to
strategy vector s, i.e. player i either wants to place a firefighter on a
node that already is defended at time-step i− 1 or that is burning at
time-step i− 1.
Let Safei(s) denote the set of nodes that would burn if player i switched
his action to the empty set. Formally, Safei(s) = Safe(s) \ Safe(s−i, ∅)
At this point we can define all the previous predicates inductively on
i ≥ 0. For the case i = 0 we have no player, but the process starts by
burning v0. Formally:
∀s ∈ S, ∀v ∈ V : defended(s, v, 0) = false. (1)
∀s ∈ S,∀v ∈ V \ {v0} : burning(s, v, 0) = false. (2)
∀s ∈ S : burning(s, v0, 0) = true. (3)
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These equations define the starting configuration. Equation (1) makes sure
that all nodes are undefended at time 0. Equation (3) defines that the fire
starts at node v0 and Equation (2) declares all other nodes as non-burning.
For any player i ∈ N (or time-step i ≥ 1) and for any s ∈ S we define:
invalid(s, i) =
=
{
false if si = ∅,∨
v∈si
(
defended(s, v, i− 1) ∨ burning(s, v, i− 1)
)
otherwise.
(4)
The first case in Equation (4) makes sure that it is always valid to play
the empty set. The second case states that the move of player i is invalid,
if he tries to put a firefighter on a node that is either already defended or
already burning. We can also define inductively on i ≥ 1 the predicates
defended and burning.
∀s ∈ S,∀v ∈ V : defended(s, v, i) =
∨
j∈N∧j≤i
(
v ∈ sj ∧ ¬invalid(s, j)
)
. (5)
Equation (5) states that a node v is defended at (the end of) time-step i, if
one of the players who has made a valid move until then has decided to put
a firefighter on node v.
To define that a node v is burning at (the end of) time-step i ≥ 1, we
need the neighborhood relation of nodes. Let N(v) denote the neighborhood
of v, i.e. w ∈ N(v) if, and only if, (v, w) ∈ E. Then
∀s ∈ S, v ∈ V, i ≥ 1 :
burning(s, v, i) = ¬defended(s, v, i) ∧
∨
w∈N(v)
(
burning(s, w, i− 1)
)
. (6)
Equation (6) states that a node v is burning at time-step i, if it is not
defended by the end of time-step i and at least one of its neighbors is burning
at time-step i− 1. We can also define the set of all nodes that will be saved
when a strategy vector s is played, that is the ones that are still not burning
at time-step n− 1.
∀s ∈ S : Safe(s) = {v ∈ V | ¬burning(s, v, n− 1)}.
Furthermore we can define the set of nodes that a player i helped to
save, i.e. that would burn if player i changed his strategy to the empty set.
∀s ∈ S, ∀i ∈ N : Safei(s) = Safe(s) \ Safe(s−i, ∅).
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We can consider two different and natural utility functions. The first one
models a selfish behavior while the second models a non-profitable behavior.
Selfish Firefighters Model. In this model, firefighters get paid for the
nodes they save. Intuitively, if player i makes a valid move other than the
empty set, he gets one unit of currency from each node he helped to save.
In other words, he gets paid by all nodes that are saved with respect to
the played strategy vector, but would not be saved if he would change his
strategy to the empty set. Additionally, he will get charged a penalty if he
makes an invalid move. Now let us define the utility function formally.
u
(Selfish)
i (s) =

−c if invalid(s, i),
0 if si = ∅,
|Safei(s)| − ε otherwise,
with 0 < ε < 1 and c > 0. We can see that the definition follows the intuition
very closely. Subtracting an ε cost for placing a firefighter makes sure that
players always prefer to play the empty set over placing a firefighter on a
node that is already saved. (which would not be an invalid move).
Hence, a game G(Selfish) in this Selfish Firefighters Model is defined by
a tuple G(Selfish) = (G, v0, ε, c), where G = (V,E) is an undirected graph,
v0 ∈ V is the initial burning node, and ε, c are constants. The utility function
of each player i ∈ N is defined as u(Selfish)i .
Non-Profit Firefighters Model. Here we assume that the goal of every
firefighter is to save as many total nodes as possible, independently of which
firefighters actually save more nodes. Formally, we define
u
(Non-Profit)
i (s) =

−c if invalid(s, i),
|Safe(s)| if si = ∅,
|Safe(s)| − ε otherwise,
with 0 < ε < 1 and c > 0. Hence, a game G(Non-Profit) in this Non-Profit
Firefighters Model is defined by a tuple G(Non-Profit) = (G, v0, ε, c), where
G = (V,E) is an undirected graph, v0 ∈ V is the initial burning node,
and ε, c are constants (w.r.t n = |V |). The utility function of each player
i ∈ N is defined as u(Non-Profit)i . Let us denote by G(Selfish)(G, v0, ε, c) and by
G(Non-Profit)(G, v0, ε, c) the games defined by G, v0, ε, and c in the models
Selfish Firefighters and Non-Profit Firefighters, respectively. For simplicity
we also denote by ne(G) the set of ne of the game G.
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Notice that in an equilibrium, no player plays an invalid move or puts a
firefighter on an safe node. Also, since we have that 0 < ε < 1, the utility of
playing the empty set is less than the utility of saving one node. Because of
that, given that a player does not play the empty set, the ε-value does not
affect his preferences. Therefore, we will ignore it in the proofs.
Proposition 1. For any graph G = (V,E), any initial node v0 ∈ V , any
constants ε, ε′, c, c′ such that 0 < ε, ε′ < 1 and c, c′ > 0, we have that:
i) ne(G(Selfish)(G, v0, ε, c)) = ne(G(Selfish)(G, v0, ε′, c′)),
ii) ne(G(Non-Profit)(G, v0, ε, c)) = ne(G(Non-Profit)(G, v0, ε′, c′)).
From now on we will omit ε and c in the definition of the games.
Equivalence of Games. Surprisingly, the behavior of selfish firefighters
leads to the same equilibria as the behavior of the non-profit firefighters.
Let us now formally show that the games G(Selfish) and G(Non-Profit) are
equivalent in the sense that their sets of equilibria are the same.
Proposition 2. For any graph G = (V,E) and any v0 ∈ V , if
G(Selfish) = G(Selfish)(G, v0) , and G(Non-Profit) = G(Non-Profit)(G, v0) , then
ne(G(Selfish)) = ne(G(Non-Profit))
Proof.
i) Let us show that ne(G(Selfish)) ⊆ ne(G(Non-Profit)):
Let s = (s1, ..., sn) ∈ ne(G(Selfish)). If s 6∈ ne(G(Non-Profit)), then there
is a player i who can improve his payoff by changing his strategy
from si to another s
′
i. If we denote by s
′ = (s−i, s′i), we have that
u
(Non-Profit)
i (s) < u
(Non-Profit)
i (s
′), and then |Safe(s)| < |Safe(s′)|.
By definition,
Safe(s) = Safe(s−i, ∅) ∪ Safei(s) , and
Safe(s′) = Safe(s−i, ∅) ∪ Safei(s′).
Notice that Safe(s−i, ∅) = Safe(s′−i, ∅) and Safei(s′)∩ Safe(s−i, ∅) = ∅.
Then, their cardinalities of Safe(s′) and Safe(s′) can be expressed as:
|Safe(s′)| = |Safe(s−i, ∅)|+ |Safei(s′)|, (7)
|Safe(s)| = |Safe(s−i, ∅)|+ |Safei(s)|. (8)
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Since we have assumed that |Safe(s)| < |Safe(s′)|, then |Safei(s)| <
|Safei(s′)| contradicting the fact that s ∈ ne(G(Selfish)).
ii) Let us now prove that ne(G(Non-Profit)) ⊆ ne(G(Selfish)):
Let us suppose that there is a strategy s = (s1, ..., sn) ∈ ne(G(Non-Profit))
which is not in ne(G(Selfish)). Then, there exists a player i and a strat-
egy s′i 6= si such that |Safei(s)| < |Safei(s′)| where s′ = (s−i, si).
Since we can express the cardinalities as in (7) and (8), and |Safei(s)| <
|Safei(s′)|, then
|Safe(s)| < |Safe(s′)|.
But this is a contraction with the fact that
s = (s1, ..., sn) ∈ ne(G(Non-Profit)).
Social Welfare. We define the social welfare of a strategy as the number
of the nodes that are saved, i.e. W (s) = |Safe(s)|.
Corollary 1. Let G = (V,E) be a graph and let v0 ∈ V . Let G(Selfish) =
G(Selfish)(G, v0) and G(Nonprofit) = G(Nonprofit)(G, v0) . Then,
PoA(G(Selfish)) = PoA(G(Non-Profit)),
PoS(G(Selfish)) = PoS(G(Non-Profit)).
Therefore we will use the utility function which is more convenient for
the proofs. From now on, we will also refer to a firefighter game with G,
whenever the respective result holds for both the selfish and the non-profit
model.
4 Quality of Equilibria
Once we have established the model, we can analyze the quality of the
equilibria. It is easy to argue that equilibria always exist. Notice that in
the non-profit firefighter model the social welfare of a strategy s coincides
with the utility of every player i on such strategy, W (s) = |Safe(s)| =
u
(Non-Profit)
i (s). Hence, in the case of non-profit firefighters, every strategy
that maximizes the social welfare also maximizes the utility of every player
i. In an optimal solution s no player protects nodes that are already saved
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or already burned. Then s not only is a optimal solution but also a Nash
equilibrium. Therefore, we have the PoS is 1. This is independent of the
class of graphs we are considering and holds for every solution concept where
players maximize their utility function.
Proposition 3. For any firefighter game G,
PoS(G) = 1.
In contrast to the PoS, the PoA might be very high in this model. In
Figure 1 we depict a family of graphs GPoA(n) = (VPoA(n), EPoA(n)) that
allows us to show a linear lower bound for the PoA. Note that (v1, v4) ∈
EPoA(n) and (v2, v3) ∈ EPoA(n). For better visibility these edges are not
drawn in the picture. Further we have that |VPoA(n)| = n, hence the size of
the complete subgraph is n − 8, and nodes v1, v2, v3 and v4 are connected
to every node in the complete subgraph.
v0
v1
u0
v2
v3
v4
u1
u2
complete graph
Figure 1: Family of graphs GPoA(n) = (VPoA(n), EPoA(n)).
Theorem 1. For any n ≥ 1, the firefighter game G = G(GPoA(n), v0) sat-
isfies that:
PoA(G) = Θ(n).
Proof. Notice that any strategy profile s of the game G satisfies that Safe(s) ≤
n. Hence, we only need to prove PoA(G) = Ω(n).
Recall that the fire starts at v0. It is easy to see that s = ({v1}, {v2}, ∅n−3)
is the optimal strategy. Only nodes v0 and u0 burn, hence the social welfare
is W (s) = n − 2. Furthermore we have that s′ = ({v3}, {v4}, ∅n−3) is an
equilibrium. Note that the complete graph is burning after two time-steps,
therefore at time-step 3 only u1 and u2 are neither burning nor defended.
But these nodes are already safe, hence players i with i > 2 will not place
12
firefighters on them. Furthermore, players 1 and 2 cannot improve their
payoff, since if one of them changes strategy, that player will save at most
one node. The social welfare of s′ is W (s′) = 4. Hence, we have that
PoA(G) ≥ n−24 . It follows that PoA(G) ∈ Ω(n).
The Price of Anarchy for Trees. Since the PoA might be very high in
general, we are interested in studying the quality of equilibria for particular
topologies. Our aim is to prove that there are cases where the quality of the
equilibria is close to the quality of an optimal solution. In the following we
analyse the PoA on tree topologies.
Theorem 2. For any tree T = (V,E) and any node v0 ∈ V , the firefighter
game GTree = G(T, v0) satisfies that:
PoA(GTree) ≤ 2.
Proof. In this proof, we use ideas similar to the proof of the approximation
ratio of a greedy algorithm in a paper by Hartnell and Li [26]. We assume
that the initial burning node v0 is the root of the tree. We use the utility
functions of the selfish firefighters. This implies that the utility u
(Selfish)
i of
player i is less than, or equal to, the size of the subtree rooted by si.
Let s = (s1, . . . , s|N |) be a ne and let opt = (opt1, . . . , opt|N |) be an
optimal solution. Notice that for each pair of different players i, j, we have
that si can not be an ancestor of sj . Even though that it can be the case that
opti is an ancestor of optj , we can always consider an equivalent strategy
opt’ = (opt−j , ∅) such that W (opt’) = W (opt). Hence, there exists an
optimal strategy opt’ such that, for every pair i, j, i 6= j, the subtrees
rooted at opt’i and opt’j , respectively, are disjoint.
Let optA be the set of optimal actions opti that they are neither equal
to any strategy sj nor successors of any strategy sj . Formally,
optA = {opti | ∀j ∈ N : sj 6= opti ∧ sj is not an ancestor of opti}.
Let optB denote the remaining optimal actions:
optB = {optj | j ∈ N ∧ optj 6∈ optA}.
Let P (opti) denote the set of strategies sj that are successors of opti.
Let sA denote the set of strategies, that do not have an optimal action as
an ancestor. Formally,
sA = {si | ∀j ∈ N : optj is not an ancestor of si}.
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Let sB denote the remaining player actions.
sB = {sj | j ∈ N ∧ sj 6∈ sA}.
Let save(a) denote the number of nodes saved by action a. Notice that
save(si) = ui(s) (the size of the subtree rooted at si) and save(optj) is equal
to the size of the subtree rooted at optj . Moreover, since the subtrees rooted
at opti and optj are disjoint, then W (opt) =
∑
i∈N save(opti). Therefore,
we have that ∑
i∈N|opti∈optB
save(opti) ≤
∑
i∈N|si∈sA
save(si). (9)
Since s is a ne, then for each i ∈ N
save(si) ≥ save(opti)−
∑
sj∈P (opti)
save(sj),
Otherwise player i would have an incentive to switch his strategy to opti.
Summing up over all optimal actions in optA, we get∑
i∈N|opti∈optA
save(opti) ≤
∑
i∈N|opti∈optA
save(si) + ∑
sj∈P (opti)
save(sj)
 .
We can split up the sum on the right hand side and get∑
i∈N|opti∈optA
save(si) +
∑
i∈N|opti∈optA
∑
sj∈P (opti)
save(sj).
Note that in the double sum, we sum up exactly over the player actions that
have an optimal action as an ancestor i.e. sB. So we can rewrite this to∑
i∈N|opti∈optA
save(opti) ≤
∑
i∈N|opti∈optA
save(si) +
∑
i∈N|si∈sB
save(si).
Now we can use Inequality 9 to get∑
i∈N
save(opti) ≤
∑
i∈N|opti∈optA
save(si) +
∑
i∈N
save(si).
Furthermore, we have that
∑
opti∈optA save(si) ≤
∑
si∈s save(si) which yields
to ∑
i∈N
save(opti) ≤ 2
∑
i∈N
save(si).
Since W (s) =
∑
i∈N save(si) and W (opt) =
∑
i∈N save(opti), we have that
PoA(Gtree) ≤ 2.
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As we will see in Section 6, the problem of finding a ne of a given
firefighter game G is polynomial time computable. Hence, the algorithm of
computing a ne yields a polynomial time approximation algorithm for the
firefighter problem with an approximation ratio bounded by PoA. In the case
of the trees, the algorithm of computing a ne provides an approximation
algorithm with an approximation ratio upper bounded by 2 (the number of
nodes saved by an optimum solution is at most twice the number of nodes
saved by a ne solution as in the case of the greedy algorithm presented
in [26]).
5 Coalitions
In this section we consider that players may form coalitions among them-
selves. A coalition is willing to deviate from their strategy as long as no
player in the coalition loses payoff and at least one player increases his util-
ity. We show that this may affect the PoA. We consider that a strategy
vector s is an equilibrium strategy with respect to coalition size k, if no set
of at most k players can simultaneously change their strategies in such a way
that at least one player increases his payoff and no player of the coalition
decreases his payoff. In the following we define formally these concepts.
Let K ⊆ N be a coalition set and let s be a strategy profile of all the
players in N . Let sK denote the joint strategy profile of all the players in
K, sK = (si)i∈K . We say that coalition K has an attractive joint deviation
from s when there exists a joint strategy profile s′K , such that for all i ∈ K,
ui(s) ≤ ui(s−K , s′K) and there is at least one player j ∈ K such that uj(s) <
uj(s−K , s′K).
We say that a strategy profile s is an equilibrium with respect to coalition
size k if for every K ⊆ N such that |K| ≤ k, coalition K does not have any
attractive deviation from s. Let Ek ⊆ S denote the set of all equilibria with
respect to coalition size k.
In the case of equilibria with respect to a coalition size, we do not have
an equivalence between selfish and non-profit firefighters like in the Nash
case.
Lemma 1. There exists a graph G, a node v0 ∈ V (G), and a coalition
size k > 1 such that the firefighter games G(Selfish) = G(Selfish)(G, v0) and
G(Non-Profit) = G(Non-Profit)(G, v0) satisfy that:
Ek(G(Selfish)) 6⊆ Ek(G(Non-Profit)).
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Proof. Consider the graph in Figure 2 and assume a coalition size k ≥ 2.
Note that only Players 1 and 2 can make meaningful moves, hence without
loss of generality we denote the strategy vector with s = (s1, s2).
v0
v2
v1
v′1
v′2
Figure 2: Example Graph. Note that all nodes have distance at most 2 from
the fire.
We have that s = ({v1}, {v2}) is an equilibrium strategy for the selfish
firefighters, since deviating to s′ = ({v′1}, {v′2}) would decrease the utility of
Player 2. However, s is not an equilibrium strategy for non-profit firefighters,
since the joint deviation s′ increases the total number of saved nodes.
Lemma 2. There exists a graph G, a node v0 ∈ V (G), and a coalition
size k > 1 such that the firefighter games G(Selfish) = G(Selfish)(G, v0) and
G(Non-Profit) = G(Non-Profit)(G, v0) satisfy that:
Ek(G(Non-Profit)) 6⊆ Ek(G(Selfish)).
Proof. Consider the graph in Figure 3 and assume a coalition size k ≥ 2.
Note that at most the first 3 players can make meaningful moves, hence,
without loss of generality, we denote the strategy vector with s = (s1, s2, s3).
v0
v2
v1
v′3
v′1
v′2
Figure 3: Example Graph. Note that all nodes have distance at most 3 from
the fire.
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We have that s = ({v1}, {v2}, ∅) is an equilibrium strategy for the non-
profit firefighters, since deviating to s′ = ({v′1}, {v′2}, {v′3}) would decrease
the total number of saved nodes. However, s is not an equilibrium strategy
for selfish firefighters, since the joint deviation s′K = ({v′1}, {v′2}) strictly
increases the utility of player 1 without decreasing that of player 2.
From now on we will only consider non-profit firefighters since they re-
semble the usual objective to save as many nodes as possible.
5.1 Price of Anarchy
We analyze the PoA for coalitions and its relation with the coalition size.
Definition 4 (Price of Anarchy for coalitions). The PoA for a coalition size
k (PoAk) of a game G is defined as follows:
PoAk(G) = maxs∈SW (s)
mins∈Ek W (s)
.
We show that the PoA for a coalition size k is O(nk ) for any class of
graphs.
Proposition 4. Let k > 1 be the coalition size. Any non-profit firefighter
game G = G(G, v0) where |V (G)| = n ≥ 2k and any v0 ∈ V (G) satisfies
that:
PoAk(G) ≤ n
k
− 1.
Proof. In order to show this bound, we bound the welfare of the optimal
solution from above and bound the welfare of the worst equilibrium from
below. Let us consider the following two cases:
i) If there is an optimal solution that uses k or less firefighters, a coalition
of size k can always make a joint deviation to that solution. Hence,
there are no equilibria that have a lower welfare than the optimal
solution. It follows that PoAk(G) = 1 for those instances.
ii) If every optimal solution uses strictly more than k firefighters, the
optimal solution saves at most n − (k + 1) nodes. This is because it
uses at least k + 1 time-steps and at least one node burns every time-
step, otherwise the fire would be contained. An equilibrium however
always saves at least k nodes in this case, because for every strategy
profile where the players save less than k nodes, the first k players can
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jointly deviate to the first k steps of the optimal solution, saving at
least the nodes they protect, i.e. k. This yields the desired bound,
PoAk(G) ≤ nk − 1.
Furthermore, we can also show that there exists a family of graphs where
this upper bound is tight. Figure 4 shows the construction of the family of
graphs GPoA(n, k) = (VPoA(n, k), EPoA(n, k)), with |VPoA(n, k)| = n. All
nodes that are not specifically depicted are inside the complete subgraph.
Hence the size of the complete subgraph is n−4k−2. Note that nodes v1 to
vk+1 are connected to every node in the complete subgraph. The nodes v
′
1
to v′k together with w form a clique. Furthermore, for every vi and uj and
for every v′i and u
′
j there are edges (vi, uj) and (v
′
i, u
′
j), respectively, if i ≤ j.
Last, for every ui and u
′
i there is an edge to ui+1 and u
′
i+1, respectively. We
refer to v0 as the initial fire, nodes v1 to vk+1, u2 to uk+1 and the complete
subgraph as the left part of the graph, and the rest as the right part of the
graph.
v0
u2ukuk+1
v1v2vkvk+1
u′2 u
′
k
v′1 v′2 v
′
k
w
complete graph
Figure 4: Family of graphs GPoA(n, k) = (VPoA(n, k), EPoA(n, k)), with
|VPoA(n, k)| = n.
Theorem 3. Let k > 1 be the coalition size. For any n ≥ 2k, the non-profit
firefighter game G = (GPoA(n, k), v0) satisfies that:
PoAk(G) = Θ(n
k
).
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Proof. Let us show that PoAk(G) = Ω(nk ). Notice that the welfare of any
strategy profile is a lower bound for the welfare of an optimal solution,
while the welfare of any equilibrium gives an upper bound for the worst
equilibrium in terms of quality.
The strategy profile s∗ = (v1, v2, . . . , vk+1, ∅|N |−k−1) saves all but 3k + 1
nodes. The nodes that burn are u2 to uk+1 and v0 as well as the right part of
the graph. This yields a lower bound for the welfare of an optimal solution.
Furthermore, we have that s = (v′1, v′2, . . . , v′k, ∅|N |−k) is an equilibrium
that saves node w and the nodes that are protected by the firefighters. Since
at time-step k + 1 there are no vulnerable nodes left, players i, with i > k,
have no incentive to deviate from the empty set. Furthermore, we have to
argue that for every joint deviation of a coalition of size k at most k + 1
nodes can be saved.
We use an inductive argument to show that there is no attractive joint
deviation for any coalition of size k into the left part of the graph. Notice
that for the left side of the graph, v1 is connected to all other vulnerable
nodes, which means that if player 1 does not protect v1, then all vulnerable
nodes in the left part will be adjacent to the fire in the next time-step. The
next player can protect only one extra node but then everything burns with
a total number of two saved nodes. If player 1 protected v1, node v2 assumes
the role of v1 for the next time-step, because it is again connected to all other
vulnerable nodes. Hence, for time-step i, with i ≤ k, we have the following
situation. If players from 1 to i− 1 protect nodes v1 to vi−1, respectively, vi
is connected to all other vulnerable nodes. If player i does not protect vi the
next player can protect one at most extra node and everything else burns,
yielding a number of at most i + 1 total saved nodes. This implies that in
order to save at least k + 1 nodes in the left part of the graph, players from
1 to k have to protect nodes from v1 to vk, respectively, and player k+1 has
to play an action different from the empty set. Hence, more than k players
would have to jointly deviate from strategy profile s.
For the right part of the graph, we can make a symmetric argument,
where v′i assumes the role of vi for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k. This yields that the
only way to save at least k + 1 nodes is to play strategy profile s.
Finally, we have to argue that there is no attractive joint deviation con-
sidering the case that some nodes from both sides from the graph are pro-
tected. Note that both sides of the graph burn in two time-steps if there are
no firefighters. This implies that the only way to place firefighters in both
parts of the graph is to put one in the left side at the first step and one
in the right side at the second, or vice versa. Then, at the third time-step,
all other nodes in the part where the firefighter was placed in the second
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time-step are burning. In the part where the first firefighter was placed all
unprotected nodes are also burning or adjacent to the fire. This means that
only one extra node can be saved in the third time-step and then the process
finishes saving at most three nodes.
Now, we can conclude that s ∈ Ek and we have that W (s) = k+ 1. This
yields a lower bound
PoAk(G) ≥ n− 3k − 1
k + 1
≥ n
k + 1
− 3.
From this lower bound jointly with the general upper bound shown in propo-
sition 4, it follows that PoAk(G) = Θ(nk ).
It is interesting to see that in the same family of graphs {GPoA(n, k)}n≥2k,
if n = Θ(k), then PoAk(G) = Θ(1). But in general, since k is a constant,
we have that PoAk = Θ(n). It seems natural to analyze whether coalitions
can improve the quality of equilibria for certain families of graphs. In the
next subsection we address this question to the particular case of families of
graphs having constant cut-width.
5.2 Graphs with Constant Cut-width
In this section we explore the impact of the cut-width of a graph on the
PoA for certain coalition sizes. In order to define the cut-width of a graph
we need to introduce some basic concepts.
Definition 5 (Cut-width under a linear order). Given a graph G = (V,E),
let L = (v0, . . . , vn−1) be a linear order of V . The cut-width of G under the
linear order L is denoted by cw(G,L) and it is defined as follows:
cw(G,L) = k
if, and only if, for every i such that 0 ≤ i < n− 1, the number of edges with
one endpoint in {v0, . . . , vi} and the other in {vi+1, . . . , vn−1} is at most k
and there exists j, 0 ≤ j < n − 1, such that the number of edges with one
endpoint in {v0, . . . , vj} and the other in {vj+1, . . . , vn−1} is equal to k.
Definition 6 (Cut-width of a graph). The cut-width of a graph G is denoted
by cw(G) and it is defined as follows:
cw(G) = min{k | ∃L linear order of V : cw(L,G) = k}.
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Lemma 3. Let (G, v0) an instance of the firefighter problem. Then, there
exists a strategy profile such that at most b(cw(G)) nodes are burned for
some function b.
The proof of a more general version of this claim in contained in the
proof of Theorem 2 of [10] and brings us into the position of showing the
following proposition.
Proposition 5. For any k ≥ 1, for any graph G = (V,E) such that cw(G) =
k, and any v0 ∈ V , there exists a coalition size bk such that:
PoAbk(G(G, v0)) ≤ 1 +
bk − 1
n− bk
Proof. Let G = G(G, v0) where G = (V,E), v0 ∈ V and cw(G) = k. By
Lemma 3 there is strategy profile s, such that at most bk = b(cw(G)) nodes
burn. Now we make use of the fact that the number of time-steps before
the spreading of the fire stops is less or equal to the total number of burned
vertices. This is because in each time-step at least one node has to burn,
otherwise the spreading of the fire would be stopped. Hence we get that with
strategy profile s, the fire is contained in at most bk time-steps. Note that
we can place at most one firefighter per time-step, therefore a coalition of
size bk can apply this strategy profile. Furthermore, only a constant number
of nodes burn. Hence, asymptotically, we have that PoAbk(G) ≤ n−1n−bk .
t1
u1
v1
w1
t2
u2
v2
w2
t3
u3
v3
w3
tm
um
vm
wm
Figure 5: Family of graphs Gcw(n) with constant cut-width.
However, we cannot achieve this PoA without coalitions as the following
instance shows. Figure 5 shows a family of graphs Gcw(n). Note that
n = 4m. Each ti is connected to ui and vi, furthermore we have edges
(ui, vi) and (vi, wi) for each i. Additionally, for each i < m, we have edges
(ti, ti+1), (ui, ui+1) and (vi, vi+1). A linear layout is given by the horizontal
position of the nodes in the figure,
(t1, u1, v1, t2, w1, u2, v2, t3, w2, . . . , tm, wm−1, um, vm, wm).
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It shows that the cut-width of the graph is at most 6, since every vertical line
through the graph crosses at most 6 edges. Let v0 = u1 be the initial fire.
Without coalitions, saving the nodes v1 to vm is an equilibrium, since each
player saves one extra node and cannot do better by switching to another
node. Note that only a constant fraction of the nodes are saved, whereas
in the case of coalition all nodes except a constant number can be saved.
Thus, for this class of graphs, constant size coalitions can improve the PoA.
6 Computational Complexity
Let us explore the computational complexity of computing equilibria. More
specifically, let us bound the computation time of a best response and the
converging time of best response dynamics.
Lemma 4. For any coalition size k ≥ 1, the computational complexity of
finding an equilibrium with respect a coalition size k of any given non-profit
firefighter game is polynomial time computable.
Proof. Let G = G(G, v0) any non-profit firefighter game and let n = |V (G)|.
Note that for a given strategy vector s, we can simulate the spreading of fire
in polynomial time and hence compute the social welfare W (s) and check
whether there are no invalid actions in s. Let O(q(n)), for some polynomial
q, denote the computation time.
For a coalition size k, we can find a best response (if it exist) in time
O(q(n)·nk) by simply trying out every possible joint deviation. Furthermore,
we have that the social welfare is strictly increased with every best response,
since it equals the utility function of the players. Recall that the social
welfare counts the nodes that are saved, so its value cannot exceed n − 1.
Hence, the best response dynamics converge after at most n iterations.
It follows that we can find an equilibrium in time O(p(n) · nk) for some
polynomial p.
This implies that we can find equilibria in polynomial time in the case
of constant size coalitions. This yields to a polynomial time approximation
algorithm for the firefighting problem. The computation of a ne with re-
spect a coalition size k can be seen as an approximation algorithm with an
approximation ratio that depends on the quality of the equilibrium. Hence,
in the case of case of trees we have shown that we can compute in polynomial
time a ne and its quality with respect to the social optimum is bounded by
PoA ≤ 2 ( coalition size 1). In the case of graphs with constant cut-width
k, we can compute a ne with PoAbk ≤ 1 + bk−1n−bk (coalition size bk).
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7 Conclusions
We have defined a new strategic game that models the Firefighter Problem.
We have shown that for a particular family of graphs PoA(G) = Θ(n). For
trees however, we get a PoA(G) ≤ 2. Furthermore, we have shown that the
coalition size has a direct effect on the quality of the equilibria. We have
proved that PoAk(G) = Θ(nk ) for a specific family of graph, being k the
coalition size. We have shown that there are topologies where PoAbk(G) ≤
1 + bk−1n−bk for coalitions of constant size bk, e.g. graphs with constant cut-
width k.
Notice that it is possible to compute an equilibrium in polynomial time,
even for constant size coalitions. This can be done following a best response
dynamics. This yields to a polynomial time approximation algorithm for
the firefighter problem and its approximation ratio equals the PoA of the
corresponding game.
We think that the most promising area to explore is the PoA for other
restricted classes of graphs, and the impact of the coalition size in those
cases. Particularly interesting are classes of graphs, where we can achieve a
good PoA with constant-sized coalitions. The results for trees and graphs
with constant cut-width are a nice starting step in this direction. In the case
of trees we showed a PoA of 2, the next step would be to investigate how far
we can improve the PoA if we allow coalitions. Note that it is not possible
to get a PoA of one for trees with constant-sized coalitions unless P=NP,
since the firefighter problem is known to be NP-hard even on trees [17].
However, we can try to find restricted classes of trees where we can get a
PoA of one. Finding the most general description of trees with this property
is an open problem [18]. Other classes of graphs we want to consider are
grids and graphs with a bounded number of cycles. A related open question
is whether the Firefighter Problem is solvable in polynomial time on graphs
with path-width two [10].
It also makes sense to analyze the quality of the equilibria with respect
to different game-theoretical solution concepts and different social welfare
functions. In general there are other optimization objectives for the Fire-
fighter Problem, like for example, minimize the number of timesteps until
the fire stops spreading [18]. They have to be reflected in the social welfare
function if we want to analyze the quality of the outcomes of the game for
those cases.
A natural extension of our model is to allow more than one firefighter per
time-step and more than one initial fire. This is a generalization that has
also been made for the classical Firefighter Problem although most results
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are done for the basic case of one initial fire and one Firefighter per time-
step. Many complexity questions in the general case are still open problems,
even for trees.
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